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At the start of December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a starkly different strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This dichotomy exemplifies the core principle of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and stopping hostilities—though how this aligns with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a senior U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative reinforced this, noting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This pivot is consequential, but experts caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a senior fellow for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Friction

Differing from his predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has broken out with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Conditional Intervention

An analogous confrontation flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Some analysts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.